Motion to suppress; Qualified immunity for reporting suspected abuse; MCL 722.623-625; Lee v Detroit Med Ctr; Presumption of good faith; Warner v Mitts; Principle that there is no immunity for voluntary & unsolicited self-reports of sexual abuse against a minor; People v Mineau; Whether an indigent defendant is entitled to an expert witness; Moore v Kemp (11th Cir); Judicial recusal; Okrie v Michigan; The nemo judex in causa sua principle; Sentencing; Judicial fact-finding; Notice; People v Darden

The court held that the trial court correctly denied defendant’s renewed and amended motion to suppress his statements in his letter to authorities reporting the sexual abuse of the victim, and did not abuse its discretion by denying his request for the appointment of an expert. It also held that the trial court did not err by denying his motion to quash the bindover, and that the judge was not required to recuse himself. Finally, it held that the trial court did not engage in judicial fact-finding and that defendant had proper notice of the charges against him. He was convicted of CSC I for sexually abusing the victim, who was under 13 years old. The trial court sentenced him, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, to 300 months to 60 years for each count, to be served concurrently. The court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by denying his amended motion to suppress statements he made in a report in which he blamed his estranged wife for his actions and suggested she was a threat to their son. “Contrary to defendant’s assumption, nothing in the plain language of MCL 722.625 conveys immunity from criminal prosecution for voluntary and unsolicited self-reports of sexual abuse against a minor.” The court also rejected his claim as to the denial of his motion for the appointment of an expert witness in forensic interviewing protocol. Given his “admission of sexual contact with the victim and his intimation that his estranged wife knew about and had encouraged their sexual relationship, defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that an expert in the suggestibility of interviews would” assist the defense. He also failed to show “how denial of his motion for an expert witness resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial.” As to his motion to quash the bindover, and his claim that the judge should have recused himself, under the circumstances, the judge’s review of defendant’s motion “arguably did not trigger the nemo judex maxim because the motion essentially resurrected defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars,” which the judge acknowledged and had already denied. As to sentencing, the trial court “did not render factual findings, but rather, the determination that defendant’s sexual abuse of the victim began after 2006 is consistent with the information and the jury’s verdict.” Finally, the information paired with the preliminary exam was “constitutionally sufficient to put defendant on notice that he was being charged with criminal sexual penetrations that occurred with the victim while” they were living together between 2007 and 2008. Affirmed.