Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); Standing; Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins; Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship; TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez

The court held that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiff-Ward’s FDCPA claims because he could not assert a “concrete injury in fact.” A bare procedural violation of the FDCPA was insufficient to establish Article III standing, and he could not show a concrete injury that flowed from the statutory violation. Thus, it vacated the order granting defendant-NPAS summary judgment and remanded for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Ward sued NPAS for alleged violations of the FDCPA. The district court ruled that NPAS did not qualify as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA, and dismissed the case. For the first time on appeal, NPAS argued that the case should be dismissed because Ward lacked Article III standing, arguing that he failed to establish an “injury in fact.” The court rejected Ward’s contention that the violation of a procedural right under the FDCPA itself gave him standing, citing Spokeo. It noted that in Macy, it held that the concreteness requirement could be satisfied where the “FDCPA violations created a material risk of harm to the interests recognized by Congress in enacting the FDCPA.” However, the Supreme Court recently abrogated that holding in TransUnion, ruling that “in a suit for damages, the mere risk of future harm, standing alone, cannot qualify as a concrete harm.” Instead, a plaintiff must show “that ‘the risk of future harm materialized,’ or that the plaintiffs ‘were independently harmed by their exposure to the risk itself.’” The court rejected Ward’s argument that “the FDCPA created an enforceable right to know who is calling about a debt and that NPAS, Inc.’s failure to identify its full name” during a phone call concretely injured him, holding that he was unable to show that NPAS’s failure resembled a harm traditionally recognized as “a basis for a lawsuit.” He argued that the statutory violation was closely related to invasion of privacy. But the court disagreed, holding that a failure to provide “full and complete information does not closely resemble intrusion upon seclusion,” which usually requires the element of intent. The court also rejected his claim that he suffered a concreate harm in the form of confusion, noting that “confusion alone is not a concrete injury for Article III purposes.” He also could not claim a concrete harm based on his voluntarily incurred legal expenses.