Testamentary capacity to execute a will; Persinger v Holst; In re Sprenger’s Estate; Personal representative (PR)

Holding that the probate court did not clearly err in determining that the decedent had the testamentary capacity to execute the 2011 will, the court affirmed the order setting aside her 1976 will, admitting the 2011 will, removing respondent-daughter as PR of the estate, and naming petitioner as successor PR. Respondent relied heavily on an expert’s (D) “testimony that decedent was likely suffering from dementia when she executed the 2011 will. However, the fact that a testator has dementia is not dispositive as to whether she had testamentary capacity when she executed a will. The appropriate test is whether, when signing the will, the decedent was ‘able to comprehend the nature and extent of his property, to recall the natural objects of his bounty, and to determine and understand the disposition of property which he desires to make.’” Decedent told her attorney (V), a neighbor (S), and petitioner that she wished “to leave everything to petitioner.” There was no evidence she “was no longer able to understand that she owned some asset that was not mentioned in the 2011 will.” Thus, the probate court did not clearly err in concluding that she “understood the extent of her property. It was also not clearly erroneous for [it] to find decedent could recall the natural objects of her bounty.” There was no indication she forgot who respondent was. Additionally, she “understood the difference between those who were family and those who were not when expressing her intentions for the 2011 will. She told [V] that she wanted to exclude all family members from her will and devise her entire estate to petitioner.” The court also held that the probate court did not clearly err in finding that, when signing the will, decedent understood what she was doing. There was no real question that while she was in the hospital with acute dehydration for five days early in 2011, “she would not have had testamentary capacity.” But D testified that after she “was rehydrated, her cognitive functioning would return to whatever level it was at” previously. When S visited her in the nursing home after she left the hospital, she again told him “that she had made a new will devising everything to petitioner. This provides evidence that once decedent’s cognitive functions returned to their baseline” she understood she had executed a new will leaving petitioner her entire estate.