Whether a remand was “general” or “limited”; United States v Richardson; Sentencing as a career offender; USSG § 4B1.1(a); United States v. Havis

The court held that its prior remand in this case was a “limited remand,” only entitling defendant-Johnson to reconsideration of his career offender status, and was not a “general remand” permitting de novo resentencing. It remanded to the district court for reconsideration of Johnson’s career offender status in light of Havis, “which held that attempt crimes—including conspiracies—did not qualify as controlled-substance offenses for the purpose of § 4B1.1.” The district court determined that he no longer qualified as a career criminal and resentenced him, but he argued that he was entitled to a de novo resentencing rather than simply reconsideration of his career offender status. Discussing the differences between a “limited” and “general” remand, the court explained that to determine which it issued, it looks “‘to any “limiting language” in the instructions on remand and the broader context of the opinion.’” It then considered the “penultimate sentence” in its remand order here: “‘Accordingly, Johnson should be resentenced in light of Havis[,]’” and held that the order remanded only for the limited purpose of determining whether he qualified as a career offender under Havis. Although the order stated “the case would be ‘remanded for resentencing,’ without any further limiting language, the broader context of the order” supported the determination that the court issued a limited remand. The order exclusively discussed Havis’s impact on Johnson’s sentence. It did “not discuss the procedural or substantive reasonableness of the sentence, nor did it identify any other alleged errors to be considered on remand.” Affirmed.