The plea-taking process; MCR 3.971(B) & (D)(1); Reasonable accommodations under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) in court proceedings; Due process; Mathews v Eldridge; Reasonable accommodations in services; In re Hicks/Brown Minors; In re Sanborn; Finding that a respondent failed to benefit from services; Reasonableness of services during the COVID-19 pandemic; Children’s best interests; In re White; Guardian ad litem (GAL)

The court found no error in the plea-taking process as to respondent-mother, and noted that the ADA did not require accommodations for her during the trial court proceedings. It also found no plain error as to her due process claim, determining that she failed to show how the absence of a GAL prejudiced her or how appointing her one could have changed the outcome. Further, the DHHS made significant accommodations for her intellectual disability in services. As to respondent-father, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that he failed to benefit from services, and he was not denied due process because “of the temporary suspension of in-person services at the” start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the court held that terminating his parental rights was in the children’s best interests. It first concluded that the trial court did not plainly err in failing to sua sponte utilize additional procedural safeguards to ensure the mother’s “plea was knowing, understanding, and voluntary in light of her cognitive impairment.” The court noted that the trial court “altered its normal plea-taking process by taking a short recess before taking [her] plea and allowed [her] counsel, instead of counsel for the DHHS, to question [her] to establish the factual basis for the plea after [she] apparently became emotionally distraught before offering her testimony.” Thus, the record showed that it “took extra steps to ensure [her] plea was knowing, understanding, and voluntary. While the trial court failed to sua sponte take the extra precautions” she now asked for, the court held that “it did not plainly err by doing so.” As to accommodations for her in services, she did not show how those the DHHS made were not reasonably sufficient, or “identify how the services could or should have been better tailored in light of her intellectual disability.” She also did not establish “she would have fared better if other services had been offered.” As to the father, he failed to show that the DHHS did not provide him with adequate services, and the trial court did not clearly err in finding that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate his parental rights. Thus, the court affirmed the orders terminating both respondents’ parental rights.