Premises liability; Duty owed to an invitee; Hoffner v Lanctoe; Trespass; Pippin v Atallah; Open & obvious danger; Estate of Livings v Sage’s Inv Group, LLC; Special aspects; Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc; Jury instructions; Causation; The statutory collateral-source rule; MCL 600.6303; The common-law setoff rule; MCL 600.6304(4)

The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant-property owner summary disposition as to plaintiffs’ premises liability claim, by denying its motion for a directed verdict, or by declining to give defendant’s requested jury instructions. It also held that the trial court properly left to the jury the question of whether the condition that injured plaintiffs was open and obvious, and properly refused to reduce the amounts of plaintiffs’ judgments under the statutory collateral-source rule or the common-law setoff rule. Plaintiffs suffered electrocution injuries while working on defendant’s premises. The case went to trial on the premises liability claim, and the jury returned verdicts for plaintiffs. Defendant claimed the allegedly hazardous condition was open and obvious and, in any event, it met its duty to plaintiffs, regardless of whether they were invitees or trespassers. “[P]laintiffs would at most be known trespassers and [defendant] would have had a duty of care to refrain from active negligence. There was evidence to show [defendant] was actively negligent when its agents assured plaintiffs that it was safe to continue working in the excavated area. There was, as a consequence, evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that plaintiffs were invitees, not trespassers.” As to defendant’s claim that the conduit was open and obvious, “notwithstanding plaintiffs’ knowledge of the conduit, th[e] evidence supported a finding that plaintiffs would not have had reason to know that the condition was dangerous.” The court next rejected defendant’s contention that the trial court erred by declining to give its requested instructions defining what constitutes a trespasser and stating the duty owed by landowners to trespassers, and by giving plaintiffs’ requested instruction that landowners’ responsibilities may not be delegated. It was not persuaded defendant “was actually prejudiced,” and noted that omitting the instructions gave defendant “more leeway to argue that plaintiffs were trespassers to whom [defendant] owed no duty.” Further, the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of causation. Because of “disputed factual issues, there was a question of fact whether [defendant] was a cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” Affirmed.