Consolidation of cases in two different circuit courts; MCR 2.505(A); “One court of justice” clause (Const 1963, art 6, § 1); Venue; MCR 2.222 & 2.221; Applicability of 2 Crooked Creek, LLC v Frye (Unpub); Actual cash value (ACV)
Holding that the trial court erred by ordering this case and a case in a different circuit court (the Ubillus case) consolidated pursuant to MCR 2.505(A) under the Michigan Constitution’s “one court of justice” clause, the court reversed and remanded. Plaintiffs sued defendants-insurers in Oakland Circuit Court, alleging systematic underpayment for ACV losses. Weeks later, the Ubillus case, involving a class action complaint against one of the same defendants, was filed in Washtenaw Circuit Court, similarly claiming an insurance policy breach for “failing to pay the full ACV amount.” Plaintiffs’ counsel here successfully moved to consolidate this action with the Ubillus action. The court found as an initial matter that the case relied on by the trial court, 2 Crooked Creek, did not support its ruling. Reviewing case law discussing the “one court of justice” clause, the court noted the Michigan Supreme Court has explained that the “clause was not intended ‘to change the traditionally local character of the courts.’” Considering venue, the court further noted that while it is not considered jurisdictional, there was “no authority establishing that venue may simply be disregarded.” Thus, it concluded that one circuit court “does not have the plenary power to consolidate a case pending before it with a different case pending in another circuit court. Rather, consolidation is governed by MCR 2.505(A)[.]” The plain language of this court rule in turn “requires two or more actions to be pending before the court.” An order changing venue was required, and the trial court recognized this, stating in its order that the “file shall be sent to Washtenaw County Circuit Court.” The court next considered whether this change of venue was permissible under MCR 2.222 and 2.221. While the trial court had the power to order a change of venue pursuant to MCR 2.222(A), because venue was proper in Oakland County, “it could only have done so ‘on motion of a party.’” The court determined that “it would not have been erroneous for the trial court to have treated plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate as also being a motion to change venue. The timeliness of such a motion is questionable[,]” but nothing in either court rule “appears to require a trial court to deny an untimely motion to consolidate.” The court concluded that the propriety of doing so was “better addressed in the trial court.”
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