e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 76255
Opinion Date : 09/23/2021
e-Journal Date : 10/08/2021
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : People v. Jones
Practice Area(s) : Criminal Law
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Murray, M.J. Kelly, and O’Brien
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Issues:

Sufficiency of the evidence; OWI & DWLS; Identity; “Operating”; People v Hardiman; Due process

Summary

The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s OWI third offense and DWLS second offense convictions, and his due-process rights were not violated. He argued that the convictions were not supported by evidence sufficient to meet the burden of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt—as to the identity element. The facts satisfied that “the Buick was in a public place available to the general public and that defendant was intoxicated.” The parties stipulated that his “license was suspended and proper notice was given by the Secretary of State pursuant to MCL 257.212, and it is undisputed that the Buick was traveling on a public road.” As a result, the elements of DWLS were satisfied. “Finally, the OWI and DWLS offenses both contain a similar requirement: that defendant was operating a motor vehicle.” The court held that the “prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had physical control of the Buick.” Based on the facts that he “possessed keys to the Buick, admitted driving the vehicle to his own residence, and what [Officer R] testified to, the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant was operating the vehicle at that time, thus satisfying the element of identity.” Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence of his identity because significant parts of R’s testimony were not credible. “Ultimately, the jury deemed all the testimony and evidence sufficiently credible to find defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Second, defendant seemed to suggest that R’s “actions throughout the traffic stop were arbitrary with no underlying rationale.” Defendant offered several theories in an effort to show that R’s “testimony lacked credibility and that defendant was not the person driving.” However, as stated in Hardiman, “every reasonable theory about what could have happened—or here, who was driving—does not need to be negated in order for the prosecution to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the prosecution did negate several of these theories.” Affirmed.

Full PDF Opinion