Custody modification; Proper cause or change of circumstances; Removal of safety restrictions; School enrollment; Consideration of the statutory best-interest factors (MCL 722.23); Pierron v Pierron (Pierron II); Child’s primary residence; Best-interest factors (b), (c), (d), (e), & (g); Clear & convincing evidence

While the court held that the trial court’s finding that removing the safety restrictions on plaintiff-mother was warranted was against the great weight of the evidence, it concluded that the trial court did not err in determining that it was in the child’s (P) best interests to attend a specified school while in plaintiff’s care. Further, its finding that it was in P’s best interests to primarily live with plaintiff was not against the great weight of the evidence. Thus, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. As to the removal of the restrictions, the court concluded that because plaintiff had “expressed thoughts of slitting P[]’s throat in the past, and given that she has also demonstrated a willingness to discontinue her medication on the advice of her mother and without consulting her mental-health professionals,” the trial court’s ruling that removing the restrictions was in P’s best interests was against the great weight of the evidence. However, as to the school enrollment issue, “the trial court addressed each and every best interest factor.” When they were relevant to deciding which school it would be in P’s best interests to attend, it “briefly addressed the relevant facts and argument.” It noted in its best-interest analysis “that it had gone through the exhibits and heard the testimony related to both parties preferred schools.” The record showed that the teaching at the school the trial court opted for was individualized, “that the classrooms had small sizes, and that the school had numerous resources.” There was testimony that the curriculum there “offered more time for STEM work per day.” While there was also evidence that defendant-father’s preferred school would be a good school for P, the trial court found “that ‘this is about a 52/48 split’ and the evidence that one school or the other would be better was ‘not overwhelming one way or the other.’ The fact that” it ultimately determined it would be in P’s best interest to attend the one “based on what that school offered was not a finding that is against the great weight of the evidence.” Finally, the court rejected defendant’s contention that the trial court’s findings on best-interest factors (b), (c), (d), (e), and (g) in ruling that it was in P’s best interests to primarily live with plaintiff while attending the school were against the great weight of the evidence.