Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i) & (j); Motion to adjourn the termination hearing pending the outcome of respondent’s criminal trial; MCR 3.972(A); MCR 3.923(G); In re Utrera; Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination; In re Stricklin; Consideration of the children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors

Rejecting respondent-father’s claim that the trial court deprived him of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by refusing to adjourn the termination hearing pending the outcome of his criminal trial, the court affirmed the order terminating his parental rights. He did not challenge the findings that §§ (b)(i) and (j) supported termination and that it was in the children’s best interests. Rather, he asserted that the trial court erred by not granting him another adjournment. It had previously granted multiple adjournments, but determined 18 months after the termination petition was filed that it could not continue to delay the proceedings. As his children were living with their respective mothers, “MCR 3.972(A) required the adjudication trial to occur within six months of the date the petition was filed ‘unless adjourned for good cause under MCR 3.923(G).’” Under that court rule, adjournments should only be granted “(1) for good cause, (2) after taking into consideration the best interests of the child, and (3) for as short a period of time as necessary.” The court concluded that the “trial court reasonably concluded that any gains from adjourning the termination hearing were outweighed by the children’s interest in obtaining finality and closure. And holding respondent’s termination hearing before his criminal trial did not violate [his] Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or his due-process rights.” In Stricklin, as here, the only testimony respondents could have offered “that would have helped them would have been to deny that they sexually assaulted their children; testimony that appears nonincriminating on its face. That is the exact issue presented here. Respondent’s proposed testimony would have asserted that he did not sexually assault” one of his children not involved in this case, “or show her pornography. That testimony, if true, would not be incriminating and,” thus should not have any adverse effect on his criminal case. While it may be true, as he contended “that even nonincriminating testimony can later be characterized as incriminating[,]” this was not so here. Like the respondents in Stricklin, he “made the tactical decision not to testify at his termination hearing. The consequences of that decision are of his own making.”