Amendment of the information to reinstate a CSC I charge; Whether MCL 767.29 & MCR 6.112(H) conflict; People v Curtis; People v Ostafin; People v Richmond; Due process right to present a defense; Motion for appointment of an expert on false confessions; Refusal to conduct an in camera inspection of the victim’s medical & psychological records; Sentencing; Reasonableness; Vindictive sentencing; North Carolina v Pearce

The court held that the language of MCL 767.29 and MCR 6.112(H) do not conflict, and that because “defendant did not establish unfair surprise or prejudice,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting amendment of the information under MCR 6.112(H) to reinstate the CSC I charge. Also, even though the trial court denied his motion for appointment of an expert, he “was not deprived of a meaningful opportunity to present a false-confession defense.” Further, he “was not denied the right to present a meaningful defense as a result of the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for in camera review of the victim’s privileged records.” Finally, his 20 to 40 year sentence for CSC I was reasonable and was not vindictive. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by granting the prosecutor’s motion to reinstate the CSC I charge that had been dismissed after his first trial. He argued that “after an offense is dismissed at the prosecutor’s request, that offense can only be reinstated by the prosecutor filing a new indictment in district court. Because the prosecutor did not follow this procedure,” defendant asserted that he was entitled to another new trial. He did not directly address the prosecution’s claim that the amendment to the information was proper under MCR 6.112(H). Instead, he relied on MCL 767.29 and related case law to support his claim. The court held that the language of MCL 767.29 and MCR 6.112(H) do not conflict. Deciding that Curtis, Ostafin, and Richardson were not controlling and that “MCL 767.29 does not describe the proper procedure for reinstating a charge that was previously dismissed pursuant to” a nolle prosequi, the court turned to the court rule applied by the trial court when it amended the information and reinstated the CSC I charge, considering whether, under that rule, the amendment unfairly surprised or prejudiced defendant. “Because the amendment did not result in unfair surprise or prejudice to defendant, we conclude that the trial court properly amended the information under MCR 6.112(H) to reinstate” the CSC I charge. The court cautioned that its conclusion was based on the very specific set of facts—none of which were present in Curtis, Ostafin, or Richmond. Under different circumstances, such as those at issue in Richmond and Ostafin, it may have held that the prosecution in this case was required to begin the proceedings anew. Affirmed.