Auto negligence; Causation; Ray v Swager; Cause in fact; Patrick v Turkelson; Whether limitations affected plaintiff’s general ability to lead her normal life

The court concluded that even if plaintiff suffered from a serious impairment of body function due to her torn rotator cuff, defendants were entitled to summary disposition because the evidence did not establish a fact question as to causation. And it was that injury, not her non-shoulder injuries, that affected her general ability to lead her normal life. Thus, it affirmed summary disposition for defendants. It noted she failed to recognize “that causation, as an element of negligence, is separate from whether the claimant suffered a serious impairment of body function” and she did not address the trial court’s ruling on causation. No doctor had stated that her “torn rotator cuff was caused or worsened by the auto accident.” Further, she did not present “evidence of ‘a logical sequence of cause and effect.’ Following the accident, plaintiff did not report significant shoulder pain for many months, during which she continued to work as a housekeeper, and she has not provided any testimony that offers a logical link between her shoulder injury and the accident. She also identified many different dates of onset of her shoulder injury. In the absence of medical testimony or medical records or some other evidence showing the connection between the accident and the shoulder injury,” the court determined that the claim as to causation of this injury failed to rise above speculation. Plaintiff further contended on appeal that she “suffered cervicalgia or a neck strain from the auto accident.” However, assuming the accident caused her cervicalgia, the trial court did not err in concluding “that it was her shoulder injury that affected plaintiff’s ability to lead her normal life. Plaintiff testified that she was forced to stop her housekeeping business in [12/18], and she was unequivocal that her shoulder injury was the reason why she could no longer work[.]” In addition, even if post-accident changes in her recreational and volunteer activities were caused by her overall injuries, the court could not find “that limits on these occasional activities, standing alone, are significant enough to affect plaintiff’s general ability to live her normal life.”