Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), & (j); Due process; In re TK; Guardianships; In re Affleck/Kutzleb/Simpson Minors; In re Timon

Holding that respondent-mother’s due process rights were not violated, and that her abandoned guardianship argument had no merit, the court affirmed the order terminating her parental rights to the child (K). She asserted that the trial court violated her right to due process by relying on evidence apart from the testimony at the termination hearing – specifically, “oral and written statements from” K’s foster parents, statements from an expert (S) from Infant Mental Health, “and letters from members of the community in support of” K’s foster parents. In its opinion and order, the trial court stated that it cited and incorporated “by reference oral and written arguments and statements provided to the court by the . . . foster parents that detail clear-and-convincing evidence for such termination and prove same” was in K’s best interests. While it was “unclear to which specific arguments and statements the trial court was referring[,]” the court concluded that “respondent had notice and an opportunity to be heard” about them. The record contained proofs of service indicating “the foster parents’ attorney mailed and e-mailed to respondent’s counsel all responses and documents the foster parents filed with the” trial court, along with their written statements in support of K’s “continued placement with them. Respondent’s counsel was present at all” the hearings where they and their attorney were present, and “made relevant arguments in response to” their attorney’s arguments. While her counsel did not mention the written statements they filed or make “any arguments in response to the updates that the foster parents made on the record at the hearings,” no evidence indicated that counsel was precluded from doing so. As to S, the court found that respondent “had notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard” about her statements, and the trial court was permitted “to take judicial notice of the facts contained in the transcript.” Likewise, she had notice and the opportunity to be heard as to the community letters of support for K’s foster parents. Further, the trial court was allowed to “rely on this evidence in making its best-interest determination, and was not required to limit its consideration to evidence presented at the termination hearing. A child protective proceeding is a single continuous proceeding that begins with a petition and ends with a determination of whether a respondent’s parental rights will be terminated.”