Sufficiency of the evidence; Kidnapping; MCL 750.349(1)(c); People v Anderson; Child sexually abusive activity; MCL 750.349(1)(f); “Restrain”; MCL 750.349(2); Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b); MCL 768.27a; People v Jackson; Relevance; MRE 401; People v Zitka; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; People v Watkins; Amendment of the information; MCR 6.112(H); Unfair surprise; People v Goecke; Joinder; MCR 6.120(B)

The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of kidnapping, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution to admit other acts evidence, by granting its motion to amend the information, or by joining the cases. Defendant was convicted in these consolidated appeals of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person and kidnapping arising out of his behavior involving two young victims, A and F. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of kidnapping because he did not restrain A for a sufficient period of time, and that the prosecution failed to prove intent because he claimed his restraint of A was not related or incidental to his indecent exposure incident also involving A. “Because a period of restraint ‘does not have to exist for any particular length of time,’ there is no merit to defendant’s argument that the supposedly ‘brief’ duration of his restraint of [A] ‘was insufficient to support a conviction involving this serious charge.’” And the prosecution is not required to prove “the restraint was ‘related or incidental’ to a criminal act.” As to the admission of other acts evidence, the court found that MDOC reports about his behavior toward female staff were substantially similar to the victims’ trial testimonies, that his 1979 conviction on a similar charge comprised a similar scheme, plan, or system, and that the trial court did not err by admitting evidence of his prior CSC II convictions. The court next rejected his contention that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to amend the information to change the date of the offense, noting he “was not surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the amendment . . . because there was never any substantive confusion about when the indecent exposure involving A[] was alleged to have occurred, time is not of the essence to a charge of indecent exposure, [he] actually cross-examined A[] thoroughly regarding the incident of indecent exposure, and nothing about the date discrepancy calls the plausibility of the charge into doubt.” Finally, the court held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in joining the cases because evidence of [his] conduct was admissible evidence in the respective cases, and the bench trial reduce[d] the likelihood that the trier of fact would have misused the evidence.” Affirmed.