Sufficiency of the evidence; Using a computer to commit a crime; MCL 752.796(1) & (3); Effect of the jury acquitting defendant of child sexually abusive activity; Inconsistent verdicts; Accosting a minor for immoral purposes; MCL 750.145a; “Or”; People v Kowalski; Disseminating sexually explicit matter to a minor; MCL 722.675; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to investigate or adequately prepare; Matters of trial strategy; Sentencing; Presumptive proportionality of a within guidelines sentence; Motion to remand for further factual development of the record; MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a)(ii)

Holding that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions of using a computer to commit a crime, accosting a minor for immoral purposes, and disseminating sexually explicit matter to a minor, and rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court affirmed. It noted that MCL 752.796(1) “imposes criminal liability for not only committing, but also attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting another person to commit the underlying offense.” The complainant here “testified that defendant described his sexual dreams involving her and her mother during a video chat. He also mentioned that he had engaged in a ‘mother/daughter thing’ before, which [she] understood to mean that defendant ‘had sexual intercourse with’ the ‘mother and daughter of someone else.’” In addition, she testified that around the time he “told her about his dreams, her mother said that ‘she lost her virginity to a[n] older man.’” The complainant testified about actions by her mother as the video chat with defendant continued, and that her mother took her the next day to meet him “at a bus stop. The three proceeded to the motel, where defendant . . . offered the complainant marijuana, displayed pornography, and engaged in other behavior.” The court held that “a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant attempted, conspired, or solicited the complainant’s mother to commit the underlying offense of child sexually abusive activity.” That the jury acquitted him of that underlying “charge did not disturb its ability to find defendant guilty of using a computer for that purpose.” As to the accosting a minor for an immoral purpose conviction, although there was no evidence he “intended to force the complainant to engage in a proscribed sexual act, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude that defendant accosted, enticed, or encouraged her with the intent to induce her to engage in such an act.” As to disseminating sexually explicit matter to a minor, the court found that the evidence he “persisted in displaying pornography” allowed the jury to infer that he “intended to exhibit or present a performance of pornography to the complainant.”