Whether dispositions to a stepchild were revoked under MCL 700.2807(1)(a)(i) due to divorce; “Relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse” (MCL 700.2806(e)); In re Fink Estate (Unpub); In re Monahan Estate (Unpub); “Affinity”; Bliss v Tyler; Reliance on a no-fault case – Patmon v Nationwide Mut Fire Ins Co (Unpub); The Estates & Protected Individuals Code (EPIC); The former Revised Probate Code (RPC)

Rejecting appellant-former stepchild’s argument that she was related by affinity to decedent, the court held that she was not a beneficiary of his will or trust because the dispositions to her were revoked under MCL 700.2807(1)(a)(i) when he and her mother divorced. Thus, it affirmed summary disposition for appellees. Under the EPIC, absent “express terms to the contrary in the governing instrument, when a testator who has executed a will subsequently divorces his spouse, the divorce revokes any disposition or appointment of property to either the former spouse or the former spouse’s relatives.” The court found two unpublished cases – Fink Estate and Monahan Estate – persuasive and adopted their “substantively similar” analyses. Those cases found that the ex-spouse’s children were “‘not related to decedent by blood, adoption, or affinity; therefore, they would be considered "relatives of the divorced individual’s former spouse" pursuant to MCL 700.2806(e). Under MCL 700.2807(1)(a)(i),’” their right to take under the will would be revoked. While the exception in MCL 700.8101(2)(e) where there is “a clear indication of a contrary intent” applied in those cases because the wills were executed under the RPC, it did not apply here where the will was executed after EPIC became effective. Appellant contended that the Legislature, in using “affinity” in MCL 700.2806(e), “contemplated that a relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse may continue to be ‘related’ to the divorced individual after the divorce.” She asserted that due to her continuing “close, loving, father-daughter relationship with the decedent she” fell outside of the category of “‘relatives’ of the divorced individual’s former spouse whose putative bequests are revoked” by statute. The court found that even if the term affinity under no-fault “law would include her as a relative of the testator, such a definition would not apply to this case. However, even if it did, she cannot prevail.” While the court in Fink Estate and Monahan Estate “was not tasked with defining the term ‘affinity’ in the context of MCL 700.2806 and MCL 700.2807, this Court’s pronouncement that a testator’s ex-spouse’s children are not related to the testator by blood, adoption, or affinity and are considered ‘relatives of the divorced individual’s former spouse’ pursuant to MCL 700.2806(e) is both instructive and consistent with the definition of affinity in Bliss.”