Hearsay; People v Musser; Principle that a statement offered to show why police officers acted as they did is not hearsay; Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis; MRE 803(4); People v LaLone; Distinguishing People v Shaw; Expert testimony; MRE 702; People v Thorpe; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Trial strategy; Failure to make a meritless argument; Sentencing; Upward departure; People v Steanhouse; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Milbourn; Scoring of OV 4 (serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment); MCL 777.34(1)(a)

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony or by departing upward from the sentencing guidelines, that a medical expert’s testimony did not improperly invade the province of the jury, and that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of multiple counts of CSC I and CSC II for sexually abusing the victim, his girlfriend’s daughter, when she was between 10 and 13 years old. The trial court sentenced him to 50 to 90 years for CSC I and 10 to 15 for CSC II. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony from the victim’s friend, her ex-boyfriend, the investigating detective, and the expert, finding each of his claims meritless. The court also rejected his claim that the expert’s testimony improperly invaded the province of the jury because he vouched for the victim’s credibility by asserting he believed her statements, noting he “was careful to say that there may have been more to the story than he was told, and clearly stated that he ‘cannot attest to the truth of what she said.’” It further rejected defendant’s contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, finding that counsel “was not ineffective for failing to raise futile objections” to admissible testimony or make a meritless request for a Walker hearing, that counsel’s line of questioning sufficiently undermined the credibility of the expert’s testimony, and that other decisions were matters of trial strategy. Finally, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that was an upward departure from the minimum guidelines range, noting the departure “was well-supported, reasonable, and proportional to the seriousness of the offense.” Affirmed.