Objections to a domestic relations arbitration award; A trial court’s authority to vacate a domestic relations arbitration award; MCL 600.5081(2)(c); Claim that a domestic relations arbitrator exceeded his or her authority; Washington v Washington; Arbitrability; Rooyakker & Sitz, PLLC v Plante & Moran, PLLC; Comparing Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc; Division of marital property under MCL 552.19; Reeves v Reeves

The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant-ex-husband’s objections to a domestic relations arbitration award. During their divorce, the parties settled most of the issues about division of property. The issue of a vacation home purchased for $59,000 during the marriage, but with only defendant and his mother, Rose, on the deed was decided by arbitration. The arbitrator found Rose bought the property with defendant as her agent, that the money he subsequently paid Rose was in repayment for unrelated premarital loans, that he used the parties’ joint checking account to make these payments, and that he paid Rose a total of about $64,000. Based on these findings, the arbitrator concluded defendant was required to pay plaintiff half the amount of money he paid to Rose, or refinance the vacation property or the current marital home to remit this amount. Finding the arbitrator acted well within his authority to issue the award, the trial court declined to vacate it. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in contravention of MCL 600.5081(2)(c), and the trial court erred by declining to vacate the award. “Like the arbitration clause in Gordon Sel-Way, the arbitration clause at issue here was written in broad, comprehensive language. [It] gave the arbitrator the authority to decide all issues regarding the [vacation property], and did not limit the type of remedy the arbitrator could provide.” As such, in the absence of express language to the contrary, “the arbitrator’s award was within his authority to grant.” In addition, Rose “was not compelled to arbitrate, so her explicit assent to the arbitration agreement was unnecessary.” Further, none of the “alleged inconsistencies in the arbitrator’s award caused him to exceed his authority.” Finally, the court found “nothing to suggest the arbitrator failed to apply Michigan law when fashioning his award, and . . . no error on the face of the award.” Affirmed.