Removal of a child from a parent’s care & custody; Due process; Notice of the preliminary hearing; MCR 3.920(D)(2)(b); Waiver by appearance; MCR 3.920(H); MCR 3.965(B)(1); Authorization of a supplemental petition; MCR 3.965(B)(12); MCL 712A.2(b); Allegations against a nonrespondent parent; MCR 3.961(C)(2); Preliminary hearing; In re Ferranti; Reasonable reunification efforts; MCR 3.965(C)(2)(d) & (C)(4); MCL 712A.13a(9)(d); Failure to provide reunification services before removal

The court held that the trial court did not err by authorizing a supplemental petition formally removing respondent-father’s child from his care and custody. The trial court authorized the petition on the basis that respondent was currently incarcerated, unable to care for child, and had not provided any relative to care for the child. The court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by authorizing the supplemental petition after the preliminary hearing because he lacked proper notice for that and previous hearings, noting he failed to establish that the service of process related to his preliminary exam did not comply with the relevant provisions. “By appearing at the hearing and failing to raise any objections to service, [he] waived any defects in service.” In addition, the trial court record contained a proof of service stating that notice was mailed to respondent, “and e-mail correspondence showing that the notice of hearing and petition were provided to personnel at the sheriff’s office overseeing his custody in California.” Most importantly, he indicated at the subsequent hearing that he “received copies of all of the petitions and was aware of the allegations contained therein.” The court further concluded that “the trial court did not err by finding that one or more of the allegations in the petition were true.” It noted that his parental rights “have not been terminated, and the authorization of the petition was based on factors related to—but distinct from—his incarceration.” The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing “was sufficient to find probable cause that one or more allegations in the petition were true and fell within MCL 712A.2(b).” Finally, as to his contention regarding reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child, given the circumstances, particularly respondent’s “incarceration, it is unclear what efforts could have been undertaken to prevent the child’s removal beyond attempting to place the child with relatives and rehabilitating the child’s mother so that she could resume custody.” Further, his argument that the DHHS “should have provided services to him directly conflates reasonable efforts to prevent removal with reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification, and [he] cites no legal authority to support his position that reunification services should have been provided before removal.” And while it appeared the trial court and attorneys briefly and mistakenly referred to him as a “putative, rather than legal, father,” the error was “corrected on the record, and in any event had no impact on [his] substantial rights.” Affirmed.