Sentencing; Motion for “compassionate release”; 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); Career-offender enhancement; USSG § 4B1.1; United States v Havis; Whether a Havis error could constitute an “extraordinary & compelling” reason for a sentence reduction; Whether Havis can be applied retroactively; United States v Hunter; Motion under 28 USC § 2255

The court affirmed the district court, holding that defendant-McKinnie was not entitled to a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) based on a Havis error because Havis does not apply retroactively and thus, does not constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” to modify an inmate’s sentence. When sentencing McKinnie for drug crimes, the district court ruled that he was a career offender under § 4B1.1 where he had two prior convictions for controlled-substance offenses: a conviction for conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and a conviction for an attempted-trafficking offense. After the court’s decision in Havis, he petitioned under § 2255, arguing that those offenses could not provide a basis for the career-offender enhancement. But the district court rejected the petition, concluding that even though his career-offender designation “was seemingly a Havis error,” he was not entitled to collateral relief. McKinnie then moved for “compassionate release” under § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that the Havis error, obesity and hypertension, and the risk of contracting COVID-19 constituted “‘extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence.’” The district court also denied this motion. After the court remanded, the district court again denied the motion. The court first held that a Havis error cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Even though Havis held that attempted drug-trafficking offenses could not provide a basis for a career-offender enhancement, Havis came down after McKinnie’s sentence became final. Thus, the issue was “whether new judicial decisions concerning the Guidelines are ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons to modify an inmate’s sentence.” Noting that it confronted this question in Hunter, the court concluded that “federal sentencing law presumes that judicial decisions are not retroactive[,]” and it saw no reason to upset that presumption in this case. McKinnie then argued that combining the Havis error with his other allegations should succeed under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). But the court rejected this argument, holding that “his obesity and hypertension, risk of complications from COVID-19 infection, conditions of incarceration, and good behavior while in prison” did not satisfy the “extraordinary and compelling” standard required to justify a sentence reduction.