Dispute over the probate court’s appointment of a successor guardian & conservator; Appointment of a guardian; MCL 700.5306(1); Priority for the appointment of a guardian; MCL 700.5313; In re Gerstler; Appointment of a conservator; MCL 700.5401(3). Priority for the appointment of a conservator; MCL 700.5409; Appoint of a professional guardian or conservator; MCL 700.5106(1); Dissolution of a guardianship & conservatorship; Effect of incapacitation; MCL 700.5306(1); MCL 700.5401(3); Sanctions for the filing of a frivolous motion; Guardian ad litem (GAL); The Estates & Protected Individuals Code (EPIC)

The court held that the probate court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a successor conservator (appellee-Childers) instead of appellant and her brother (Wyatt) to manage their father’s (David) finances on the basis they were not suitable, but did abuse its discretion by declining to appoint her and/or Wyatt as David’s guardians or co-guardians without making findings, supported by the record, that they were unsuitable for that role. It also held that the probate court did not err by denying the family’s petition to dissolve the guardianship and conservatorship, and it declined to consider her challenges to the imposition of sanctions for filing frivolous motions. The probate court initially appointed a public administrator (nonparty-B) as David’s guardian and conservator. David’s family later moved for an order of restitution to be imposed against B, asserting he caused David’s investment accounts to lose significant value. The probate court denied the motion and granted B’s request for sanctions on the basis that the motion was frivolous. It later denied another motion by the family and again granted B’s request for sanctions on the basis it was frivolous. It eventually appointed Childers as successor guardian and conservator. On appeal, the court first determined that the probate court did not err by finding appellant and Wyatt lacked sufficient sophistication to manage David’s finances. It “duly considered” their priority for appointment as conservators, and did not err by finding they were not suitable. As such, it “did not abuse its discretion by appointing Childers as David’s successor conservator.” However, the probate court “failed to support its finding that appellant and Wyatt are unsuitable to serve as David’s guardians.” David’s GAL and Childers “both stated that they had no objection to appellant’s or Wyatt’s appointment as David’s guardian or co-guardians. They agreed that David received good care in the family home, and there is no evidence on the record that David has been neglected or harmed in the family’s care.” The court next found that appellant’s challenges to the imposition of sanctions for “frivolous” motions were not properly before it. Finally, it rejected her contention that the probate court erred by denying the family’s petition to dissolve the guardianship and conservatorship, noting the probate court “was bound by the statutory provisions of the EPIC when determining David’s need for a guardian and a conservator, and could not simply leave his care to his family without complying with the statutory framework.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.