Confirmation of an arbitration award; Res judicata; Collateral estoppel; Scope of the trial court’s decision on the motion to stay proceedings; The Uniform Arbitration Act; MCL 691.1686; Attorney fees & costs

Concluding that collateral estoppel, not res judicata, was relevant here, the court held that the arbitrator correctly determined collateral estoppel barred defendant from relitigating the issue of whether he was bound by the whole unsigned employment contract. The arbitrator further found in the final award that the evidence presented at the arbitration hearings supported that he was bound by it. Finally, even if the court were to agree with defendant, this would not provide a ground for modifying the award of attorney fees and costs, the only aspect of the arbitration award he challenged on appeal. After he resigned, plaintiff-former employer filed a demand for arbitration and defendant “brought an action to permanently stay the arbitration proceedings.” He asserted he could not be bound by the arbitration provision because he never signed the contract. But the trial court concluded that he “had assented to the terms of the employment agreement by his continued employment with plaintiff.” Thus, it held that they “had entered into a binding arbitration agreement and dismissed defendant’s action.” He argued in the arbitration proceedings that because he did not sign the “contract he could not be bound by the substantive terms that plaintiff asserted he violated.” The arbitrator rejected this argument and determined that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred him from relitigating the existence of an employment contract. The court noted that, “in a typical case, the trial court would have decided only whether an arbitration agreement existed, not whether the larger contract was enforceable.” But defendant argued in the trial court “that the contract, as a whole, was not enforceable because he did not sign” it or otherwise agree to its terms. Thus, his contention “there was not an agreement to arbitrate necessarily required the trial court to determine whether the contract, as a whole, was binding.” A ruling by the arbitrator that the employment contract “was not enforceable would have been inconsistent with the basis for the trial court’s ruling that the arbitration provision was enforceable.” The court also noted he did not argue that the trial court erred in ruling “there was an enforceable arbitration provision, which mandated an award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party.” Defendant failed to “explain why the arbitrator should not have applied the attorney fee provision.” Affirmed.