Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (j); Reasonable reunification efforts; Children’s best interests; Domestic violence (DV)

Holding that §§ (c)(i) and (j) existed, the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, and termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s (KV and RW) best interests, the court affirmed. She correctly argued that the trial court erroneously relied on § (c)(ii) in its findings. However, it specifically referred to the language of § (c)(i), and made findings consistent with that ground. This error did “not alone warrant reversal, particularly when the DHHS requested termination on the correct basis and the trial court made the appropriate findings.” Crucially, the trial court did not clearly err by holding that “182 days had passed since the initial dispositional order, that conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist, and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the” children’s ages. The mother’s initial dispositional order for KV was entered “approximately 39 months before the termination hearing began . . . .” It entered her initial dispositional order for RW “approximately 19 months before the termination hearing began . . . .” The conditions that led to the adjudication primarily involved DV, and the mother continued to be involved in it. Specifically, she had a black eye in 2/20, as a result of respondent-GW (RW’s father) headbutting her, and she engaged in DV in 8/19 by attempting to cut a caseworker’s clothing. KV entered care as a result of respondent-EV (KV’s father) shooting at her car, and her car was involved in a shooting in 10/20. Additionally, she “engaged in threatening behavior toward RW’s placement on the first day of the termination hearing. Finally, there was no reasonable likelihood that mother could rectify the conditions in a reasonable time considering the children’s ages.” Despite over three years of services, she “continued to engage in aggressive behaviors, including threatening RW’s placement, and she had been incarcerated for the third time during the case as recently” as 1/21 through 3/21. She “stopped engaging in most services in fall 2020, well before the termination hearing began,” making it unlikely that she would benefit from services. “KV had already been in care for nearly two years by the time RW was removed from mother for continuing issues of [DV], and both children had been in care for most of their lives by the time of the termination hearing.” Thus, the trial court did not err by holding that evidence supported termination under § (c)(i).