Auto negligence; The sudden-emergency doctrine; White v Taylor Distrib Co, Inc; “Reasonable” care; Case v Consumers Power Co; Competent evidence; Reliance on an affidavit; MCR 2.116(G)(6) & 2.119(B)(1); MRE 602, 701, & 702; Threshold injury; MCL 500.3135(1); “Serious impairment of body function”; MCL 500.3135(5); McCormick v Carrier; Triggering symptoms of a pre-existing condition; Wilkinson v Lee; Effect of conflicting evidence; MCL 500.3135(2)(a)

Holding that defendant-Aquilina was not entitled to summary disposition based on the sudden-emergency doctrine and that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff suffered a threshold injury due to the accident, the court reversed summary disposition for Aquilina and remanded. It concluded that there was a fact question for “the jury whether defendant breached the standard of care under all the circumstances, even accepting as true his contention that he faced a sudden emergency when he suffered a seizure in the moments before the accident, having never before suffered” one. He contended, and the trial court apparently “accepted as true that experiencing a seizure while driving excuses him from any alleged negligence related to the accident. In this way, defendant and the trial court treated the sudden-emergency doctrine as an affirmative defense. However, the experience of a sudden emergency does not provide an affirmative defense to a negligence claim, . . . but is instead merely one of the factors to consider in determining whether a person was negligent by failing to act as a reasonably prudent person would have under” the circumstances. The court also found that he did not “support his sudden-emergency defense with competent evidence.” His statement in his affidavit that he suffered a seizure was “attributed to ‘information and belief.’ He did not claim to have personal knowledge that he suffered a seizure, or even explain what information led him to believe that he had” one. The court noted that “a first-time seizure is not a general condition that can be rationally based on the perception or self-diagnosis of the person suffering the seizure, especially where the occurrence of an alleged seizure is based on information and belief, rather than personal knowledge; therefore, defendant’s belief that he had one was not permissible lay opinion testimony under MRE 701. [He] did not submit an affidavit by a medical expert, or any other evidence explaining the basis for his information or belief that he actually” had a seizure. The court also concluded that “a jury could reasonably find from medical records submitted in this case that trauma from the accident caused exacerbated symptoms from plaintiff’s pre-existing conditions,” and that there was evidence creating a fact question as to the first and third McCormick prongs.