Divorce; Enforceability of a marriage settlement agreement; Lentz v Lentz; Consideration of equity; Factual findings; “Illusory” promises; Mastaw v Mastaw; Ambiguity; Impossibility; Duress; Clement v Buckley Mercantile Co

The court held that the trial court erred in denying defendant-ex-wife’s (Delores) motion to enforce the parties’ marriage settlement agreement (the SA). It concluded that, considered in context, there was nothing in the trial court’s “comments on the Lentz footnote to support that [it] misunderstood or failed to apply the correct legal standards from Lentz.” Also, it did not appear that the trial court’s errors in its factual findings, “on their own, affected the outcome of the case[.]” But considering the provision as to the distribution of equity in a building owned by a trust created by the parties, the court held that the trial court’s determination of illusoriness was erroneous, and it erred by failing to enforce their SA based on “some unspecified ambiguity or the possibility that a dispute may arise in the future related to the execution of the” SA. It further erred by finding impossibility, and plaintiff-ex-husband (Thomas) failed to show duress. Thus, the court reversed the trial court’s interlocutory order denying Dolores’s motion to enforce the SA and remanded with instructions to enforce the SA. She contended that a remark by the trial court indicated that it violated Lentz by considering equity. This argument lacked merit. “When considered in context, the trial court’s commentary on the Lentz footnote was nothing more than an aside. The trial court articulated the correct standard from Lentz at length.” But the court found the trial court erred in holding that the SA term as to the sale of the dental-practice building was illusory. Given that the trust owned “the building, practically speaking, splitting the equity will require dissolution of the trust and a distribution of its assets. Upon dissolution, Dolores will receive 96% of the trust assets, and given the terms of the [SA], she will be obligated to pay Thomas his share of the equity from the building.” Notably, in their SA, they “did not endeavor to afford Thomas an interest in the trust or to resolve the rights of third parties, other than recognizing that fees, commissions, and liens would be paid before the parties split the equity.” Fairly considered, they reached a clear SA as to “their respective shares in the equity in the building following” its sale. The involvement of a trust did not invalidate their agreement. Further, while the trial court stated there were “several areas” of the SA that were ambiguous, “it failed to actually identify an ambiguous provision.” The trial court also erred by finding impossibility. It was baseless for Thomas to claim that his age or the possibility of his future retirement rendered it impossible for him to comply with the SA.