Deadlocked jury instructions; People v Walker; Coercion; Exclusion of testimony about contradictory statements previously made by the victim about another matter; MRE 608(b) (allows impeachment of a witness by specific instances of conduct that are probative of truthfulness)

The court determined that there was no evidence of the type of coercion involving deadlocked jury instructions that would require reversal. Also, the trial court did not err by excluding evidence that the victim had previously given contradictory statements as to an incident in which her father hit her. Defendant was convicted of CSC I. He argued that “the trial court made statements that did not conform with the standard deadlocked-jury instructions, and these off-script instructions constituted reversible error because they were unduly coercive.” Defendant’s first issue was “whether the trial court committed reversible error based on the content of its ad-lib remarks immediately after the deadlocked-jury instructions.” He admitted the “trial court’s first set of instructions complied with the standard deadlocked-jury instructions under M Crim JI 3.12.” However, he argued the additional statements it “made immediately after were a substantial departure from the standard instruction because the statements ‘crossed the line from encouraging deliberation to instead impressing the need to reach unanimity.’” Rather than being coercive, the court held that “the trial court’s statements were words of encouragement, meant to inspire and compliment the jury." The trial court was "merely pointing out the fact that the jurors constituted a jury cannot be considered coercive language.” An important piece of context in this case was “the fact that the standard instructions and the trial court’s off-script remarks were given contemporaneously.” Also, the court held that “the coercive atmosphere created by the Walker trial court” was not present. The trial court’s instructions here “did not lack constructive advice to encourage further deliberation and, because the standard instructions were given only moments before the ad-lib instructions, the necessary safeguards were communicated to the jury.” Further, the atmosphere created by the trial court here was not coercive or adversarial as in Walker. There was nothing here “to suggest a hostile courtroom atmosphere; the jury and trial court appeared to be cooperating with one another during communications back and forth after the jury asked for assistance and clarification.” Affirmed.