Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Children’s best interests; In re White; Reasonable reunification efforts; Distinguishing In re Mason

The court held that § (c)(i) was established as to respondent-mother, and that the trial court did not clearly err in finding termination was in her children’s best interests. It also was not definitely and firmly convinced the trial court was mistaken in determining the DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent-father with his child, and it rejected any claim that the trial court improperly terminated his rights based on his incarceration. Thus, the court affirmed the orders terminating respondents’ parental rights. As to the mother’s challenge to the existence of a statutory ground for termination, the record showed it was “clear that, despite the DHHS’s extensive efforts to” help her with her substance abuse issues, she “failed to make significant progress towards rectifying the barrier. Every time” she appeared to be making progress, “she relapsed and was setback on her path to sobriety. By the last day of the termination hearing, the three oldest children had been in foster care for over two years and the youngest child had been in foster care for over 1½ years.” Given the mother’s track record, “the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that there was no reasonable likelihood that this condition would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages.” Despite the lack of analysis in her appellate brief as to her claim that termination was not in their best interests, and the failure to include this issue in her statement of questions presented, the court addressed and rejected the claim. “The children had been together in the same foster home for a lengthy period. They were doing well and were ‘very happy’ there, and the foster mother, who had a large, stable home; a stable, flexible job; and family support, wanted to adopt all four” of them. It also addressed the father’s claim that the DHHS failed to make reasonable reunification efforts, despite finding it inadequately briefed. The court determined that the caseworkers who assisted him “appeared to do as much as they could under the circumstances.” He admitted one caseworker “sent him a letter inquiring about his plans for release, but he had not replied to that or certain other communications.” He had also been provided services at the start “of the case before his incarceration, but he did not adequately participate in them.” The court found Mason “readily distinguishable . . . ."