Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, & Liability Act (CERCLA); Liability under 42 USC §§ 107 & 113 as an “arranger”; Liability under §§ 107(a)(1) & (2) as “successors” to prior responsible companies; Whether “bare bones" declaratory judgments of liability in prior litigation started CERCLA’s statute of limitations (SOL) for contribution claims running, making them time-barred; RSR Corp v Commercial Metals Co.; Georgia-Pacific (GP); Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs); Kalamazoo River Study Group (KRSG); International Paper (IP)

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] In an issue of first impression, the court held that a “bare bones” declaratory judgment triggered the limitations period, barring plaintiff-GP’s contribution claim. Also, noting it had not directly addressed the issue beyond RSR, it held that § 113(g)’s SOL “should bar an action against a nonparty beyond the statutory period.” The EPA designated “the Kalamazoo River and Portage Creek as a high priority for cleanup” due to PCB-contamination. GP and two other paper companies formed the KRSG, which filed a cost-recovery action under CERCLA. Some of the defendants in that action countersued, and the district court “found the KRSG members—including GP—liable ‘for the PCB contamination of the [relevant site].’” It also found one defendant, Rockwell, liable and another defendant, Eaton, partially liable. In 2010, GP brought this action under §§ 107 and 113 against defendant-NCR as an “arranger” and against defendants-IP and Weyerhaeuser under § 107(a)(1) and (2) as “successors” to prior responsible companies. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on the three-year SOL for contribution claims, which “begins to run when a party receives a ‘judgment’ in a CERCLA action or enters an ‘administrative settlement’ concerning such an action.” The court concluded that although IP and Weyerhaeuser were not parties to the KRSG litigation, it “does not matter for § 113(g)’s purposes whether the particular contribution action is pursued against a party to the liability-assigning judgment, or against a non-party to that judgment.” The court then considered “whether the 1998 declaratory judgment’s bare-bones nature prevented it from beginning the running of § 113(g)(3)(A)’s” SOL. It noted that no circuit had decided a case concerning the start date for the running of the SOL "when a party faces a bare declaratory judgment of liability.” The court applied RSR’s rule for CERCLA’s SOL in the settlement context and held that “the 1998 bare declaratory judgment caused the limitations period to begin to run.” As it determined “in RSR, GP had received the responsibility to pay for ‘as-yet-unfinished’ remedial work. . . . The 1998 declaratory judgment on liability therefore started the contribution clock ticking.” The court found that § 113(g)(3) barred the contribution claims against both IP and Weyerhaeuser, “even though Weyerhaeuser dismissed its own appeal from the judgment” here. Further, GP “cannot pursue its § 107(a) claims for any costs that fall within the scope of the 1998 KRSG judgment.” Reversed and remanded.