Agreement containing a payback provision for water benefit fees; A consent judgment as a contract; The last-antecedent rule; Substitution of parties; MCR 2.202(B); Attorney fees under a consent judgment; Reasonableness; Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n; Necessity of an evidentiary hearing

The court concluded that the trial court did not err when it ordered defendants (collectively the Township) to enter into a cost-sharing agreement with plaintiff-Seven Lakes Partnership (Seven Lakes) containing a payback agreement. Also, the trial court properly added Seven Lakes as a party, and it did not err in awarding attorney fees to Seven Lakes. The case arose out of a consent judgment between plaintiff-Seven Lakes Development and the Township concerning approximately 459 acres of undeveloped land owned by Seven Lakes Development. The court held that Seven Lakes was “entitled to a payback provision for reimbursement using water benefit fees ‘for improvements which connect to the Improvement[,]’ i.e., Segment 2, from ‘[t]he area and properties benefitted by the Water Improvements[.]’ The Township’s ordinance requiring Seven Lakes to extend the water line across its property, and the Township’s insistence Segment 2 be constructed in its entirety, provided Seven Lakes with no option other than to build Segment 2 to bring water to its property.” Given the parties’ intent and the “circumstances, the trial court did not err when it determined Seven Lakes was entitled to a payback provision for water benefit fees paid by properties in the water benefit district of Segment 2.” The Township also alleged the “trial court erred by permitting Seven Lakes to substitute itself as a party-plaintiff in this case in contravention of MCR 2.202(B).” But Seven Lakes, as the successor in interest of the “acres it purchased from Seven Lakes Development, LLC, was not required to move to permit its substitution under MCR 2.202(B). Furthermore, MCR 2.202(D) allowed for substitution even after entry of judgment.” In addition, the evidence showed “the trial court, in awarding attorney fees to Seven Lakes, was aware of its discretionary authority” to do so under the consent judgment. Finally, there was no indication it “abused its discretion in reasoning the hours billed by Seven Lakes’s counsels were higher than might normally be expected for a case like this, because of the fast-paced nature of the case, which was required by the consent judgment.” It also did not abuse its discretion in rendering the award without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Affirmed.