The No-Fault Act (the Act); PIP benefits; Whether injuries arose out of the “maintenance” of the vehicle or a fall; MCL 500.3105(1); Distinguishing Woodring v Phoenix Ins Co & McMullen v Motors Ins Corp; Parked-vehicle exclusion, MCL 500.3106(1); “Parked”

Holding that plaintiff was not entitled to PIP benefits for injuries sustained from a fall into an oil change station service pit, the court reversed the trial court’s order granting her motion for partial summary disposition and remanded for entry of an order granting defendant-insurer summary disposition. The court concluded that plaintiff’s vehicle was simply “incidental to the circumstances.” The cause of her injuries was her fall into the service pit. And her fall “was not in any way a direct result of the maintenance being performed on her vehicle. In other words, the performance of maintenance on plaintiff’s vehicle did not directly cause plaintiff to fall into the service pit and sustain injuries.” Unlike in the cases of Woodring and McMullen, which the trial court relied on, “in this case no condition created by the maintenance being performed caused plaintiff’s injuries. The filter that plaintiff was being asked to look at did not cause plaintiff to fall into the service pit. And the fact that plaintiff was asked to look at the filter by the service technician did not cause plaintiff to fall into the service pit. Rather, it was plaintiff’s lack of attention to where she was walking that caused her to fall into the service pit and sustain injuries. Even if plaintiff did slip on something before falling as she claimed in her deposition, there was no evidence that the slippery substance came from the filter or” her vehicle. In short, her “claimed injuries did not arise out of the maintenance of her vehicle because the connection between plaintiff’s claimed injuries and the maintenance of her motor vehicle was no more than ‘but for,’ incidental, or fortuitous.” She alternatively claimed that MCL 500.3106(1)(a) applied. The court first addressed whether her “vehicle was ‘parked’ within the contemplation of this exception to the parked vehicle exclusion of” the Act. It noted that her vehicle was inside the service facility “for the purpose of getting the oil and filter changed, i.e., maintenance.” Plaintiff claimed that if it “had completely covered the service pit, she would not have fallen into the” pit. The court determined she was essentially “claiming that the manner in which her vehicle was positioned over the service pit—with a gap large enough for a person to fall through and into the pit—posed an unreasonable risk of injury.” Under these circumstances the court held that her “vehicle was not ‘parked’ for purposes of” the Act and thus, her “injuries did not arise out of the use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle under MCL 500.3106(1).”