Petition to initiate child protective proceedings; MCR 3.961(A); “Petition”; MCR 3.903(A)(20); “Petitioner”; MCR 3.903(A)(22); Requirements for a petition; MCR 3.961(B)(1)-(6); Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Whether the interests of the public or the juvenile require that further action be taken; MCL 712A.11(1); Preliminary inquiry; MCR 3.962(A) & (B)(1)-(3); MCR 3.903(A)(23); Standing; In re Jagers

The court held that the trial court erred by denying petitioner’s petition to initiate child protective proceedings against respondents-parents as to their care of his minor sister, FN. Petitioner, respondents’ adult child and FN’s sibling, alleged in his petition that respondents were unfit to raise FN without state supervision. He claimed his upbringing was mentally abusive and dysfunctional, and court intervention was necessary to save FN from the same. He requested the trial court order supervision of FN’s psychological development and unspecified “treatment” for respondents. On appeal, the court found the trial court “erroneously dismissed the petition for lack of standing, and this amounted to error requiring reversal.” If the Legislature “wanted to restrict who may initiate child protective proceedings, it would have done so statutorily—as it did with termination-of-parental-rights proceedings.” However, by allowing any “person” to initiate child protective proceedings, it “expressly provided anyone who has knowledge of potential child abuse or neglect with standing to request court action to protect the child. To read the law regarding initiation of child protective proceedings any more restrictively would ignore both the plain language and expansive purpose of the Juvenile Code.” It noted the “adult sibling of a minor assuredly qualifies as a person and may initiate proceedings to protect the minor.” As such, given the “plain meaning of MCL 712A.11(1), petitioner had standing to file the petition to initiate child protective proceedings against his parents regarding their care of FN.” In addition to having standing, “petitioner’s petition contained the necessary components . . . .” Because petitioner did not request “any form of placement for FN or termination of respondents’ parental rights, the trial court had discretion to dismiss the petition after a preliminary inquiry.” Because petitioner filed a valid petition to initiate child protective proceedings, the trial court “was obliged to consider the merits of the petition and make a discretionary ruling regarding how to proceed. In failing to do so, the trial court’s erroneous dismissal of the petition for lack of standing directly impacted the outcome of the case by eliminating the possibility of further child protective proceedings.” Thus, reversal was warranted for the trial court “to consider the petition’s merits and to make a discretionary decision about how to proceed with the petition under MCR 3.962(B).” Reversed and remanded.