Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under 42 USC § 1983; Qualified immunity; “Clearly established” right; Distinguishing Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc & Martin v. City of Broadview Heights; Municipal liability; Official policy or custom

The court affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity for defendants-police officers as to plaintiff’s excessive force claim arising from their use of the “maximum resistor technique” on her decedent (Thomas), who died of cardiac arrest. It held that she failed to show that Thomas had a clearly established right against this type of force. He called 911 and told the dispatcher he believed he might be overdosing on cocaine, that he had a rapid heartbeat, he was hallucinating, “and that he feared he would be shot.” Five minutes after the call, police were on the scene. When defendant-Pinkerman knocked on the door, Thomas ran out of the house screaming. After falling down several times and refusing to obey Pinkerman’s orders, other officers arrived and he was eventually handcuffed but “continued being uncooperative and combative . . . .” An officer left to get a “hobble strap.” While waiting for the strap, defendant-Andrews tried to restrain the still-resisting Thomas by using the maximum resistor technique. Defendants-Shaffner and Stephens assisted him. Their goal “was to restrain Thomas to permit paramedics to safely enter the scene and treat Thomas for an overdose.” He arrived at the hospital in critical condition, and never regained consciousness. A medical expert disputed the coroner’s opinion that Thomas died from a cardiac arrest caused by the cocaine, and countered that the cardiac arrest was “caused by ‘forcible restraint that precluded adequate breathing.’” Thomas’s estate sued for excessive force under § 1983 and for Ohio state-law claims. Plaintiff disputed the district court’s finding that there was no record evidence indicating that either Andrews or Shaffner applied pressure to Thomas’s back or torso when he was on the ground. She argued that the initial statement of a paramedic, which was later changed, and a photo of a bruise supported her position and created a genuine issue of fact prohibiting summary disposition. The court found the evidence too speculative, as there were many reasons why a bruise could have appeared in that area. Further, as to whether plaintiff showed the violation of a clearly established right, it found the cases on which she relied distinguishable, and held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant-city was also entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff could not establish “that Thomas suffered an injury due to the city’s official policy or custom.”