Applicability of the No-Fault Act (NFA); Property protection; Owner’s obligation to maintain no-fault insurance; Retroactive application of Dye v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co; Iqbal v Bristol W Ins Group; Pohutski v Allen Park; Whether Dye should be limited to cases involving PIP benefits & not be extended to cases involving property protection insurance; Insurance maintained by corporate entities; Terms of the policy; Fraud in the procurement; “Use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle”; Auto repair business exception; MCL 500.3101(1); Late-filed documents; Motion to strike affirmative defenses; Statute of limitations; MCL 500.3145(5); The relation-back doctrine; Fraudulent concealment; Equitable estoppel ; Breach of contract; Unjust enrichment; Greg Hibbitts Transport Company (GHTC); Beline Transportation Services (BTS)

The court affirmed summary disposition for defendants-GHTC, BTS, and others (referred to as the Hibbitts defendants) of plaintiffs’ tort claims on the ground the NFA applied and precluded the claims. Among other things, it rejected plaintiffs’ claim that Dye should not apply retroactively. Also, it declined to limit Dye’s application to cases involving PIP benefits and concluded that it applied to a determination of whether GHTC “maintained no-fault insurance as required by MCL 500.3101(1).” The case arose from an engine fire in “a parked semi-truck, which resulted in damage to a nearby building and the building’s contents.” Plaintiffs, the owner and the tenant of the building, sought to recover damages from several defendants. In addition to granting summary disposition on plaintiffs’ tort claims to the Hibbitts defendants, the trial court granted summary disposition to defendant-Fremont Insurance, holding that “plaintiffs’ claims for no-fault benefits were time-barred by MCL 500.3145(5) and that Fremont was entitled to summary disposition on plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10).” On appeal, plaintiffs contended as to the Hibbitts defendant that the NFA “does not apply and that tort liability is not abolished under MCL 500.3135(3) because GHTC—as the registered owner of the truck— failed to maintain security as required by MCL 500.3101(1).” The court held that “under Dye GHTC, as the truck’s owner could fulfill its obligation to maintain insurance under MCL 500.3101(1) by having another person or entity maintain insurance.” Plaintiffs unsuccessfully offered “a long list of arguments why Dye should not apply and why the Fremont policy should not be held to satisfy MCL 500.3101(1) or to result in the abolition of tort liability under MCL 500.3135(3).” The court first rejected their assertion that Dye should not apply retroactively. It concluded that “Dye was not unforeseeable and did not announce a new principle of law by overruling clear past precedent.” Rather, Dye adhered to the NFA’s plain language “and reaffirmed the holding in Iqbal. Because Dye did not clearly establish a new principle of law, it does not satisfy Pohutski’s threshold question and should be applied retroactively.” The court further found there was “no statutory basis for concluding that Dye should only apply to PIP benefits or that some higher or different standard is required for an owner to ‘maintain’ property protection insurance.”