Admissibility for impeachment purposes of a written statement by defendant attached to a PSIR; MCL 791.229; People v Rohn; People v Hooper (After Remand)

On remand, the court again affirmed the trial court’s challenged evidentiary ruling, holding that in light of Rohn and Hooper, the trial court did not err in concluding “that MCL 791.229 allowed introduction of defendant’s prior statement from the PSIR for impeachment purposes.” Defendant challenged the trial court’s ruling that statements he “made during a prior sentencing hearing were admissible for impeachment purposes in his upcoming trial.” He also challenged the trial court’s ruling that his written statement, submitted with the PSIR as to “why he was entitled to leniency, could also be used for impeachment.” The court previously affirmed the trial court’s order, and remanded for the trial to take place. “On defendant’s application, the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, but remanded for us to reconsider the issue of whether the statement attached to the PSIR could be used at trial in light of MCL 791.229.” The court first found that “both Rohn and Hooper made clear that the importance of impeachment (whether done by defendant or the prosecution) to the search for the truth can overcome the confidentiality of the statute. Second, the statute does not speak to the admissibility of reports or statements attached to the report but instead speaks only to the confidentiality of the reports in terms of ‘disclosure to the public,’ and who is able to access the reports and information. Indeed, as others have noted, there are several positions and entities related to the court system—including judges and the attorney general—that are statutorily allowed access to the reports.” Thus, the court concluded that “if defendant chooses to testify and testifies inconsistently with his prior statement made a part of the PSIR, MCL 791.229 does not foreclose its use by the prosecution for impeachment.”