Medical malpractice; Determining whether a claim sounds in ordinary negligence or medical malpractice; Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, Inc; Whether an expert satisfied the requirements of MCL 600.2169; Motion for an extension to submit a new affidavit of merit (AOM); Futile request to amend; Personal representative (PR)

The court held that plaintiff-PR’s claim sounded in medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence, and that her expert (F) did not meet MCL 600.2169’s requirements. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to submit a new AOM where the trial court did not grant defendant summary disposition due to any deficiencies in the AOM. Plaintiff’s decedent (Quick) was a 97-year-old woman with dementia when the events leading to this case occurred. She fractured her leg when she apparently moved it “through the rail of the stretcher and it collided with the doorframe” as she was being transported at defendant’s hospital. She died a few weeks later. It was undisputed she “was a cervical-spine precaution patient. As a result, only a registered nurse” (RN) or a physician could transport her. An RN in defendant’s ER (nonparty-L) was acting in her capacity as an RN when she was assigned to Quick’s care. “She testified that she used her knowledge and training in transporting patients with Quick’s medical condition when she moved Quick. Specifically, she ensured that Quick was on the stretcher, the rails were up, and that Quick had a blanket over her. She added that, because Quick was disorientated, there were additional risks associated with her transport so closer observation was required. [L] tried to take those additional risks into account during the transportation process. A jury relying only on common knowledge and experience would not know what would constitute proper transportation of a patient with Quick’s medical condition.” Thus, the trial court correctly found that plaintiff’s “claim sounded in medical malpractice, not ordinary negligence.” As to F’s qualifications, she stated during her deposition “that she was a ‘charge nurse’ in 2016 when she worked triage and ‘helped nurses with their patient care.’ However, she expressly testified that 30% of her duties were clinical and 70% were administrative. Because she did not spend the majority of her professional time in 2016 (the year before Quick’s injury) on the ‘active clinical practice of the same health profession in which the party against whom’ was licensed, she could not satisfy” MCL 600.2169(1)(b). Affirmed.