Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), & (k)(iii); “In the future” requirement; Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; Whether reasonable reunification efforts were required; MCL 712A.19a(2)(a); Distinguishing In re Newman; Due process; Trial via Zoom; Waiver; Administrative Order No. 2020-6 & Amended Administrative Order No. 2020-17; The trial court’s refusal to hear additional testimony as to jurisdiction & statutory grounds; Refusal to allow a child to testify; Competency; MRE 601; Ineffective assistance of counsel; In re Mota; Child’s best interests

The court rejected respondent-mother’s due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and held that §§ (b)(i), (g), (j), and (k)(iii) supported terminating her parental rights. It further found that reasonable reunification efforts were not required here, and that termination was in the child’s (P) best interests. Thus, it affirmed the termination order. As to respondent’s due process arguments, the court found no merit in her claim that she did not waive her right to an in-person trial before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. It added that even if she had not waived the issue, “the trial was held via Zoom because respondent was ill, in compliance with Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Orders” and she did not explain how conducting it “via Zoom affected the outcome of the proceedings.” The court also concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that P “was not competent to testify. P[] never articulated that he could tell the difference between the truth and a lie and never promised to tell the truth.” His responses also revealed “that he did not have the capacity to testify understandably.” As to statutory grounds for termination, respondent challenged the “in the future” requirement as to §§ (b)(i), (g), and (k)(iii). However, under the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, given her “severe physical abuse of” another of her children (S) and previous “physical and verbal abuse of” S and another child, “the trial court did not clearly err by finding there was a reasonable likelihood that” P would be harmed if returned to her care. The court also noted that testimony respondent had hit P with a “wooden back scratcher, leaving temporary red marks, further” supported a finding that he was at risk of harm in her care. While respondent contended “termination was premature and she should have been provided with services and the opportunity to show her ability to parent[,]” the trial court referee recommended that reasonable reunification efforts were not required due to evidence showing P “was subjected to ‘[e]xtreme physical abuse’ by respondent. The trial court adopted the referee’s recommendation” and later determined clear and convincing evidence supported termination under § “(k)(iii), which expressly requires a finding of ‘[b]attering, torture, or other severe physical abuse.’” Thus, pursuant to MCL 712A.19a(2)(a), reasonable reunification efforts were not required.