Sentencing; Departure sentence; Proportionality; People v Dixon-Bey

The court held that neither the trial court’s decision to depart from the sentencing guidelines in sentencing defendant, nor the extent of that departure, was an abuse of discretion. He was convicted of reckless driving causing death and failure to stop at the scene of accident causing death. At his initial sentencing, the trial court departed from the guidelines and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 10 to 15 years for each conviction. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed his convictions but remanded for the trial court “to either issue an order further articulating its reasons for the extent of the departure sentences or to resentence defendant.” At a resentencing hearing, the trial court affirmed the departure sentences. In the present appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was entitled to resentencing. “On the basis of the seven valid factors relied on by the trial court in issuing its sentences, we conclude that the trial court sufficiently ‘articulat[ed] its reasons for the extent of the departure sentence[]’ as directed by this Court, . . . such that it adequately explained how the departure, though significant, was proportionate to the offense and the offender.” The court agreed with the trial court that defendant’s “repeated and failed rehabilitation attempts suggest that he is likely to engage in criminal activity, including potentially more severe criminal activity, again in the future.” In addition, neither the “remand order nor caselaw requires a sentencing court to justify its length of departure against every other hypothetical departure amount. The trial court was simply asked to further articulate its reasoning for the extent of its departure sentences, which it did.” It was also “not required to explain the difference between defendant’s conduct and the conduct of a hypothetical defendant with the same convictions.” Further, nothing about the trial court’s admonition of defendant implied that it was relying on his “refusal to admit guilt as a basis for its departure sentences. Rather, the trial court was referencing defendant’s fleeing the scene of the crash without offering assistance to his friend, the victim, as well as [his] subsequent attempts to diminish the severity of his crimes during the sentencing proceedings.” Finally, the trial court’s statement, “[I]f I could have sentenced you to a term greater than ten to fifteen years I would have,” did not reflect “a violation of the principle of proportionality, and” thus, it could not be said that its “sentences were an abuse of discretion.” Affirmed.