Delayed application for leave to appeal; Requirements to file a successive motion for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR 6.502(G)(2); “Retroactive change in the law”; People v Stovall; Miller v Alabama; Montgomery v Louisiana; People v Parks; Life without the possibility of parole (LWOP)

The court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing defendant’s application for leave to appeal, because he met the requirements to file a successive motion for relief from judgment. It held that Miller and Montgomery served “as the ‘foundation’ or ‘base’ for” his challenges to the constitutionality of his mandatory LWOP sentence. Thus, his motion was “based on a retroactive change in law” and overcame MCR 6.502(G)’s procedural bar, and the Court of Appeals and trial court erred in concluding otherwise. He was convicted of first-degree murder for a crime he committed when he was 18 years old. After his appeals were unsuccessful, he “twice previously moved for relief from judgment, pursuant to MCR 6.500.” This was his third motion. Because the merits of his motion were not “considered under MCR 6.500, on remand, the Court of Appeals shall determine whether” he is entitled to relief based on the court’s holding in Parks that mandatory LWOP “sentences imposed on 18-year-old defendants are categorically disproportionate and thus unconstitutional under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Under Parks, such offenders are entitled to the full protections and procedures afforded to juveniles in Michigan’s sentencing scheme, MCL 769.25, including a consideration of the attributes of youth as described in Miller,” before imposing a sentence for first-degree murder. “The Court of Appeals shall determine what remedy, if any, is available to defendant under Parks, including whether defendant should be resentenced pursuant to MCL 769.25a.”

Dissenting, Justice Viviano reiterated, for the reasons stated in his dissent in Stovall, that he did not believe defendant overcame “the procedural bar to file a successive motion for relief from judgment and would deny leave to appeal under MCR 6.502(G). But even if defendant could overcome the procedural bar,” Justice Viviano would find that his constitutional argument failed for the reasons stated by Justice Clement in her dissent in Parks.

Separately dissenting, Justice Clement (joined by Justice Zahra) agreed that defendant “met the procedural bar in MCR 6.502(G)(2) because his motion is ‘based on a retroactive change in law . . . .’” But for the reasons stated in her dissent in Parks, she did not believe he “should be afforded relief on the merits, as he was 18 years old when he committed first-degree murder and I believe he is constitutionally subject to the mandatory” LWOP sentence set out by the Legislature. Thus, she would deny leave to appeal.