Circuit court jurisdiction in actions for divorce & separate maintenance; MCL 552.6(1) & MCL 552.7(1); Intervention & third-party joinder in a divorce case; Estes v Estes; Yedinak v. Yedinak; Killingbeck v Killingbeck; Appellate standing; Federated Ins Co v Oakland Cnty Rd Comm’n; League of Women Voters of MI v Secretary of State; “Aggrieved party”; In re Estate of Trankla; Effect of a failure to take the proper procedural steps for review; Burton-Harris v Wayne Cnty Clerk (Burton-Harris II)

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant-DHHS’s motion for reconsideration of its order for spousal support directing the transfer of essentially all defendant-husband’s assets and income to plaintiff-wife. Plaintiff filed a complaint for separate maintenance stating she and defendant lived together as husband and wife for years until he suffered a stroke that required his placement in a nursing home. She claimed that if she ever became disabled her income and assets would be insufficient to support herself if his income and assets would be used to pay for his care in the nursing home or long-term care facility. She noted that once on Medicaid, 100% of his care needs would be met by his Medicaid benefits. Plaintiff asked the trial court to order defendant to pay spousal support “in the amount of [the] total marital estate” and assign his social security income to her. The parties stipulated to entry of a support order, which the trial court entered. “Designating itself as an ‘interested party,’ DHHS moved for reconsideration of the support order.” The trial court agreed with plaintiff and defendant “that third-party intervention in domestic-relations matters was only permitted in limited circumstances that did not apply to DHHS,” and denied its motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the court agreed with plaintiff that the only issue properly before it was whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying DHHS’s motion for reconsideration. “Plaintiff and defendant were the only proper parties in this action for separate maintenance. There was no suggestion that DHHS conspired with either party to defraud the other, so DHHS’s involvement in this case does not fall within the narrow fraud exception for third-party joinder. Rather, DHHS moved for reconsideration of the support order on the basis that it improperly placed the financial burden of defendant’s long-term care on DHHS.” As such, the trial court “did not abuse its discretion by denying DHHS’s motion for reconsideration. Like any other person claiming to be adversely affected by the support order, DHHS had to pursue a remedy through means other than involvement in the divorce proceedings.” The court then concluded that even if DHHS had appellate standing, “it did not follow the appropriate procedural requirements to challenge the support order on appeal.” DHHS never moved to intervene in the case, “either before the trial court or on appeal. Thus, like in Burton-Harris, the only issue properly before” the court was the trial court’s denial of its motion for reconsideration.