Sentencing; Money laundering during the course of a RICO conspiracy; Enhancements under USSG §§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), (b)(3), & 2E1.1(a); Enhancing defendant’s sentence for money laundering when his actual conviction was for RICO conspiracy; § 1B1.2(c)

The court held that because the factual basis for defendant-Nedelcu’s “plea agreement specifically established that he committed money laundering as a predicate for his RICO conviction,” the district court did not err by sentencing “him ‘as if’ he had been convicted of money laundering.” Nedelcu pled guilty to RICO conspiracy. He claimed that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence four levels for money laundering where his actual conviction was for RICO conspiracy. Focusing on § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), the court concluded that an actual conviction for money laundering is not always necessary for application of the enhancement. “Section 1B1.2(c) provides that ‘[a] plea agreement . . . containing a stipulation that specifically establishes the commission of additional offense(s) shall be treated as if the defendant had been convicted of additional count(s) charging those offenses.’ This provision means that a court must sentence a defendant ‘as if’ he had been convicted of an offense if his plea agreement specifically establishes that he committed that offense.” The court considered the admissions Nedelcu made to support the factual basis for his guilty plea, and found that his “admissions track (often word-for-word) the elements of concealment money laundering and conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering[.]” As he had stipulated to facts establishing those “additional offenses, § 1B1.2(c) required that, during sentencing, he be ‘treated as if [he] had been convicted of additional count(s) charging’ violations of” the money laundering statute. It is not necessary for a defendant to admit “that he violated a statute; he need only admit facts that allow the court to conclude that his conduct satisfied the elements of an additional offense.” Affirmed.