Fraud; Statute of frauds (SOF) (MCL 566.106); Cassidy v Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp; Promissory estoppel; State Bank of Standish v Curry; Distinguishing Featherston v Steinhoff & Carnes v Sheldon; Unjust enrichment/quantum meruit; Statutory conversion; MCL 600.2919a

In this case arising after the end of a romantic relationship, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s fraud claim related to a property based on Cassidy, which held that “an action for fraud cannot be used to overcome enforcement of the” SOF. But it found her promissory estoppel claim should be allowed to go forward, and declined to vacate the trial court’s ruling allowing her “to proceed with a claim for actual expenses associated with the” house given the absence of a cross-appeal. It affirmed summary disposition of her statutory conversion claim as to a securities account, finding her “control” theory was only conjecture. The court disagreed with plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in dismissing her fraud claims related to defendant’s alleged promise “to give her one-half of the Mackinac house in exchange for her labor in helping to construct it.” The court noted that “neither the parties nor the trial court addressed the threshold question of whether an action for fraud can be used to avoid the” SOF. The Supreme Court’s decision in Cassidy has long been recognized as standing “for the proposition that an allegation of fraud cannot be used to overcome enforcement of the” SOF in Michigan. The court noted that although “the trial court did not rely on Cassidy to dismiss the fraud claims, a trial court’s decision may be upheld if the correct result was reached for an alternative reason.” But the court agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred in dismissing her promissory estoppel claim, concluding that the allegations in her complaint and affidavit “set forth the ‘when’ of performance (when construction is completed) and the ‘how’ (conveyance of a one-half interest by means of executing a deed). The date of the conveyance is not specifically identified, but it need not be. The promise to convey is conditional (upon construction), with performance due when the condition occurs.” Further, it found that allowing the claim to go “forward would not be ‘resurrecting common law marriage’” given that she did not raise a contract implied in fact claim. But it determined that she was not entitled to relief as to the grant of partial summary disposition of her unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim (for her labor on the house). “Under Featherston, recovery under” this theory was inappropriate.