Negligence action arising from an auto accident involving a state trooper; The requirements of the Court of Claims Act; Verification of the notice of intent; MCL 600.6431; Fairley v Department of Corr; Whether plaintiff’s notarized signature was sufficient; Progress MI v Attorney Gen; MCR 1.109(D)(3); Gladson v Michigan Dep’t of Health & Human Serv (Ct Cl); MCL 600.6422(1); MCL 55.285(1)(b), (3), & (5); MCL 55.267(e) & 55.265(a)

The court held that plaintiff’s notarized signature on her notice of intent to file a claim against defendant-state “complied with MCL 600.6431(2)(d)’s verification requirement because plaintiff signed and verified her notice of intent ‘before an officer authorized to administer oaths.’” It rejected the state’s assertion that the statute requires claimants to use the declaration form set forth in MCR 1.109(D)(3)(b). Thus, it affirmed the Court of Claims’ ruling that plaintiff met MCL 600.6431’s notice of intent verification requirement and its denial in part of defendants’ summary disposition motion in this case arising from an auto accident involving a state trooper. The main issue on appeal was “whether MCL 600.6431’s notice requirement mandates that the verification be made in a specific form, and if so, what form . . . .” Defendant contended the Supreme Court defined the required form in footnote 10 of its decision in Progress MI. But the court determined that the footnote was obiter dictum. It further concluded the “plain and unambiguous language of MCL 600.6431(2)(d) restricts the choice a claimant has respecting verification of a claim or notice of intention to file a claim because it specifies that a claim or notice must contain a ‘signature and verification by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.’ Therefore, the alternative means of verification by declaration in the form specified under MCR 1.109(D)(3)(b) is not an option available to a claimant who files a claim or notice of intention to file a claim against the state. Further, nothing in the court rule or MCL 600.6431 suggests that a claimant must take a ‘belt and suspenders’ approach by using the declaration form described in MCR 1.109(D)(3)(b) and signing it ‘before an officer authorized to administer oaths’ as described under MCR 1.109(D)(3)(a). Imposition of such a combination of requirements goes well beyond the statutory verification requirement and the rule’s verification requirement.” Plaintiff was correct that including “a declaration in the form specified under MCR 1.109(D)(3)(b)” would not satisfy the statutory requirement. The court further held that she “met the statutory verification requirement by using a jurat form and signing her notice of intent before a notary public who signified that plaintiff’s signature was subscribed and sworn before the notary.”