Modification of a consent judgment; Andrusz v Andrusz; Effect of the lack of a party’s consent; Scope of the trial court’s authority to enforce the existing consent judgment; MCL 600.611; Whether the consent judgment authorized the modification order; Whether the intervenors were required to file complaints to participate in the case; MCR 2.209(C); Distinguishing an intervenor’s role as a party to the action from that of amicus curiae

The court held that the trial court erred in modifying the parties’ existing consent judgment without defendant-Gelman Sciences’ consent, and that the intervenors could not continue in the case without filing complaints. Thus, it vacated the trial court’s 6/1/21 order modifying the prior consent judgment, reinstated that judgment, and remanded. It directed the trial court on remand to require intervening plaintiffs to either “file complaints or be dismissed from the case.” This litigation arose from 1,4-dioxane (dioxane) contamination. The state and Gelman reached a settlement agreement “and in 1992 the trial court entered the parties’ proposed consent judgment as an order of the court.” The parties have amended it three times by agreement. Negotiations for another amendment went on for four years. Ultimately, the trial court “proposed to resolve the matter by entering the fourth amended consent judgment” subject to its ongoing review, and despite Gelman’s objection, it later “entered an ‘order to conduct response activities to implement and comply with revised clean up criteria.’” The court noted that the 1992 “judgment, as subsequently amended, was final and binding, and in the absence of fraud, mistake, illegality, or unconscionability, [it] could not be modified or set aside without the parties’ consent.” The 6/1/21 order was entered without their “consent and over Gelman’s repeated objections, substantially modifying the parties’ prior agreement and imposing new obligations upon Gelman. By modifying the consent judgment and forcing new terms on the parties without their consent, the trial court erred as a matter of law.” The court concluded the trial court did not have “authority to unilaterally modify the consent judgment when (1) Gelman and the state did not consent to modification of their consent judgment, (2) neither Gelman nor the state sought the trial court’s intervention under the dispute resolution procedures to resolve a pending dispute arising under the consent judgment, and (3) the state did not file any new claims and Gelman was not afforded an opportunity to defend against any new claims.” As to the intervenors, pursuant to MCR 2.209(C), “a pleading is a requirement of intervention.” The court held that, having intervened as plaintiffs, they “must file their complaints and thereby subject themselves to the incidents of litigation, or face dismissal.”