Riparian rights; Riparian land; Thies v Howland; Riparian owner; Little v Kin; Meander line; Port Sheldon Beach Ass’n v Department of Envtl Quality; Principle that a grant of land bounded by a water course generally conveys riparian rights; Grand Rapids Ice & Coal Co v South Grand Rapids Ice & Coal Co; Water’s edge as a border; Railroad Co v Schurmeir; Water rights under the Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA); MCL 565.101 & 106; Whether federal law preempts the MRTA; Packer v Bird

The court held that because land bounded by a natural watercourse is riparian, the trial court did not err by finding plaintiffs-adjacent owners had riparian rights. Plaintiffs filed a nuisance complaint against defendant, alleging its use of an island in the pond adjacent to their properties for short-term rental activity violated the local township zoning ordinance. Defendant denied their claims and asserted that because their properties did not border the pond they did not have rights to the water. Defendant also counterclaimed, requesting a decree as to water rights, enjoining plaintiffs from entering its property, and requiring them to remove their personal property from defendant’s property. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition and dismissed their nuisance complaint. In a prior appeal, the court reversed, finding defendant was violating the zoning ordinance by operating a tourist home, and that plaintiffs were entitled to summary disposition on the basis of their nuisance per se claim. Meanwhile, the trial court found plaintiffs had riparian rights to the use and enjoyment of the waters and entered summary disposition in their favor. In the present appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by finding that plaintiffs established that their properties ran to the water’s edge of the pond. “[P]laintiffs provided evidence regarding the ownership of their property that defendant has not rebutted. Although defendant now argues that the boundary was fixed at the date of the conveyance from the federal government, defendant argued in the lower court that the boundaries between plaintiffs’ and defendant’s parcels were determined by a 1966 court order that regulated the water elevation of” the pond. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, “have consistently established that for a period beyond 40 years, the legal descriptions of their properties extended to the water’s edge.” As such, the trial court did not err by finding that their properties “ran at least to the water’s edge, and that they consequently have riparian rights.” Affirmed.