Due process; Reliance on a no contest plea at the adjudication phase to establish statutory grounds for termination; Preponderance of the evidence standard for establishing jurisdiction; Clear & convincing evidence standard for termination; Court rule governing no contest pleas; MCR 3.971(B) & (D); MCR 3.977(E)

The court held that the trial court violated respondent-father’s right to due process when it relied “solely on his no contest plea at the adjudication phase” in determining that statutory grounds for terminating his parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, it vacated the order terminating his parental rights and remanded. The court noted that the evidentiary standard for a trial court to assume jurisdiction over children is preponderance of the evidence. “But to terminate parental rights, a trial court must find that” clear and convincing evidence supports the existence of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3). While “the trial court stated that it would address the satisfaction of the statutory grounds for termination and determine the bests interests of the children, it expressly limited the proofs at the dispositional hearing to best interests. In doing so, [it] effectively held that the no contest plea was conclusive evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination.” But the court noted that the plain language of MCR 3.971, which governs no contest pleas, “does not give the plea incontestable effect.” Further, when termination “is sought at the initial dispositional hearing, the court must find that the statutory grounds for termination are premised on clear and convincing legally admissible evidence.” Respondent’s no contest plea to permit the trial “court to obtain jurisdiction merely satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard.” He was not informed, “and the court rule does not provide, that the preponderance of the evidence of his plea used to support the assumption of jurisdiction would be given conclusive effect and deemed to be clear and convincing legally admissible evidence to” establish statutory grounds for termination. The DHHS was not relieved of its burden to establish that statutory grounds were proven “by clear and convincing legally admissible evidence. Moreover, the trial court expressly denied respondent the opportunity to present any evidence at the initial dispositional hearing” as to statutory grounds, stating “it would only entertain testimony addressing best interests of the children. Thus, the import or conclusive effect given to the no contest plea and the failure to allow the presentation of additional evidence addressing the statutory grounds for termination deprived respondent of due process.”