Judicial review of a Parole Board (Board) decision; In re Elias; Parole requirements; MCL 791.233(1)(a); The Board’s discretion; Factors the Board must consider; MCL 791.233e(2); MI Admin Code, R 791.7715(1); Consideration of a prisoner’s completion of recommended programs & willingness to accept responsibility for past behavior; R 791.7715(2)(b)(iii) & (d)(i); Principle that a potential parolee is evaluated under the guidelines & scored as to each guidelines category; In re Parole of Johnson; Departure from the parole guidelines for a “substantial & compelling” reason; MCL 791.233e(6); People v Young; Mental health; R 791.7716(3)(g); Qualified Mental Health Professional Evaluation (QMHP); Department of Corrections (DOC)

The court held that the trial court erred by reversing the Board’s grant of parole for appellant. In 2015, he pled nolo contendere to CSC I and II and was sentenced to 7 to 100 years and 5 to 15 years respectively. In 2021, the Board granted him parole, finding reasonable assurances existed that he would not become a menace to society or to the public safety, even though his QMHP noted concern about his willingness to take responsibility for his actions. The prosecutor successfully appealed to the trial court. On appeal, the court agreed with appellant that the Board did not abuse its discretion by granting parole, and that the trial court erred by reversing the Board’s decision because it impermissibly substituted its own judgment for that of the Board. The DOC assessed him “with a parole-guideline score that provided for a ‘high probability’ of parole.” As such, the Board was required to grant him “parole, unless there were ‘substantial and compelling reasons’ to overcome this presumption.” The court disagreed that appellant’s “failure to complete sex-offender treatment while in prison [was] a basis to overcome the statutory presumption for parole.” It noted “the Board was not required to deny parole indefinitely, or until the DOC offered a program that it had previously determined that [appellant] was ineligible to take.” Rather, it appeared “to have exercised its broad discretion by requiring the same treatment program as a condition of parole.” Finally, the court found that appellant’s refusal to take full responsibility, standing alone, did “not amount to a substantial and compelling reason to deviate from the presumption of parole.” it noted his “parole-guideline score sheet indicated that he was ‘scored -5 due to mental health factors set forth in administrative rule 791.7716, section (g).’ This negative assessment for this factor suggests that the DOC had already accounted for [his] failure to take full accountability for his criminal conduct.” Because his “failure to take full accountability was well documented, the Board had full opportunity to consider his accountability as a factor affecting parole.” By requiring “sex-offender treatment as part of his parole conditions, the Board addressed one of the concerns relied upon by the circuit court in reversing the grant of parole.” Further, the question of his “lack of accountability was factored into his overall parole-guidelines score and was among the factors the Board appears to have considered in deciding whether to grant parole. And . . . the other factors militated in favoring of granting parole.” Reversed and remanded.