Dental disciplinary action; Alleged violations of the Public Health Code; MCL 333.16221(a), (b)(i), & (h); Board of Dentistry’s Disciplinary Subcommittee (BDDS); Department of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs (LARA); First superseding administrative complaint (FSAC)

The court affirmed the final order of discipline entered by the BDDS against respondent-dentist (Isaac). Because Isaac failed to respond within 30 days to the FSAC, petitioner-LARA “was required to treat the allegations in the complaint as admissions. . . . the FSAC alleged that Isaac had not submitted proof of completing the continuing-education courses or of paying the fine and restitution and had violated” a prior order (the April order). The FSAC also “alleged that Isaac had sent ‘several obscene emails’ to LARA.” The FSAC claimed that “Isaac was subject to discipline under MCL 333.16221(h), and also under MCL 333.16221(b)(vi). The BDDS was empowered to impose sanctions on the basis of the allegations and admissions.” Isaac’s appellate briefing was “focused, in large part, on whether LARA placed unreasonable standards on her for the continuing-education requirement, but the time to make this argument was during the 30-day period stated in the FSAC. The BDDS followed the law when it complied with the ‘admission’ mandate of MCL 333.16231(9).” Thus, there was no error. To the extent she argued “that the decision to impose sanctions was arbitrary and capricious,” the court held that such an argument failed “in light of the admissions and other circumstances.” It also held that the conclusion Isaac failed to comply with the April order and should “be subject to discipline under MCL 333.16221(h) was not arbitrary and capricious.” Further, as for MCL 333.16221(b)(vi), the court concluded that given “the crude and unprofessional manner in which Isaac communicated with LARA, given that she repeatedly wished death upon persons involved in her case, and given that she did not prove that she had rectified the issues leading to the initial disciplinary proceedings, the conclusion that Isaac should be subject to discipline under MCL 333.16221(b)(vi) was not arbitrary and capricious.” It was a reasonable inference that she “lacked ‘the propensity . . . to serve the public in the licensed area in a fair, honest, and open manner.’” The court also held that “the extent of the sanctions imposed was not arbitrary and capricious in light of the history of the proceedings.” The final order “stated that Isaac’s license was suspended but would be reinstated, under a period of probation, if she underwent evaluations, complied with the April order, and paid a $5,000 fine.”