Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); Statute of limitations; MCL 15.363(1); Adverse employment action; Randazzo v Inkster (Unpub); Causal connection

The court held that the trial court erred by finding a genuine issue of material fact that protected activity engaged in by plaintiff-Robinson was causally connected to the issuance of a suspension. Defendant asserted that “Robinson’s complaint was untimely, and that even if it were timely,” she could not establish the elements of a prima facie WPA claim. The court concluded her complaint was not barred by the 90-day limitations period. The 7/9/19 report informed her that “future charges would likely come from the Disciplinary Administration Unit, and it was the 10-day suspension issued by that unit that Robinson alleges was the retaliatory employment action under the WPA. When Robinson received notice of the 10-day suspension on [8/21/19], the 90-day clock to file her claim began to run. This Notice of Discipline was defendant’s action to implement its disciplinary decision against Robinson.” Because her complaint was filed within 90 days of 8/21/19, it was timely under MCL 15.363(1). As to defendant’s argument that Robinson did not face an adverse employment action, the court found Randazzo instructive. “Randazzo presents an example—just like this case—where the threat of disciplinary action sufficed to survive summary disposition on the adverse employment action question. Here, although Robinson never served a suspension, the issuance of a 10-day suspension is sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. The WPA does not require Robinson to have actually served any suspension to present an actionable claim. Rather, the threat of a 10-day suspension is enough to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Robinson suffered an adverse employment action under the WPA.” Thus, the trial court did not err in finding “that the Notice of Discipline was a sufficient threat under the WPA.” Defendant finally argued that “the trial court erred by denying summary disposition because Robinson failed to establish a causal link between her 2017 complaints of misconduct and the 2019 suspension issued to her.” The court concluded there was no “genuine issue of material fact that the issuance of a suspension to Robinson was not motivated by retaliation for Robinson’s protected activities.” Therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s summary disposition motion. Reversed and remanded.