Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (j); Ineffective assistance of counsel in child protective proceedings; In re Casto Minors; Trial strategy; Prejudice; Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) & (c); MCL 712A.19a(2); A parent’s responsibility to participate in the services that are offered; Failure to accommodate a mental health disability; In re Hicks/Brown; Best interests of the children; In re Olive/Metts Minors

The court held that respondent-father was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, that §§ (c)(i) and (j) were met, and that termination was in the children’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed termination of his parental rights. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. First, he failed “to identify any evidence that counsel could have offered to demonstrate respondent’s commitment to his mental health treatment or potential to maintain mental stability.” In addition, he could not “overcome the presumption that counsel’s strategy of urging the [trial] court to allow [him] more time was a sound choice.” Further, there was no evidence to suggest “a more successful outcome would have been probable had visitation not been delayed.” Moreover, considering his “unwillingness to participate in the mental health services offered to him, he [did] not explain how these services could have been made more accessible and more accommodating of his mental illness.” The court also rejected his claim that the DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with his children, particularly by failing to offer services to accommodate his mental health disability. The DHHS “did offer mental health treatment services, which were the focus of respondent’s treatment plan, but it was respondent who was unwilling to cooperate with these services.” And he failed “to identify the additional services he believes should have been offered to accommodate his mental illness.” His significant mental health issues “prevented him from having unsupervised contact with the children.” As to a statutory ground for termination, he “had not only actively spurned certain efforts to improve his mental health, but his mental health conditions had arguably worsened.” As such, § (c)(i) was satisfied. In addition, because he “failed to rectify the severe mental health issues underlying his erratic behavior, there existed a reasonable likelihood that the children would be harmed if returned to his care.” Thus, § (j) was satisfied. Finally, as to the children’s best interests, the court noted he “suffered from mental health issues that contributed to his inability to focus on parenting skills or his children’s” welfare, he failed to “make any meaningful effort to address, or even acknowledge,” his mental health concerns, and the children were thriving in foster care.