Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v Taylor; Trial strategy; People v Carbin; Prejudice; People v Jordan; Failure to challenge a juror; People v Unger; Failure to object to other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); People v Wilder; Motion for a mistrial; People v Dickinson

The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, and the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a mistrial. He was convicted of second-degree murder after police received an alert from a home-security system, found defendant inside the house with a tampered alarm system, a forcefully-opened storm door, and a hole in the side of the wall of the house. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel did not remove a specific juror during voir dire. “Defense counsel used all the preemptory challenges available to her, and she challenged a different juror for cause.” Defendant failed to show “defense counsel’s use of peremptory challenges on other jurors was not strategic.” He also failed to show “defense counsel was ineffective for choosing to use all peremptory challenges on other jurors.” Moreover, the trial court “instructed the jury several times that they were to presume that defendant was innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” The court also rejected his claim that he was provided ineffective assistance when defense counsel originally agreed to allow the prosecution to ask generally about his prior conviction. However, “defense counsel did in fact object to the prosecutor’s more specific questioning and also moved for a mistrial after the trial court sustained her objection.” Moreover, the original question “the trial court would have allowed from the prosecutor, regarding defendant’s prior convictions generally,” was permissible. The prosecutor “was not asking to use the defendant’s previous conviction to impeach defendant’s credibility in general or to show that he acted in conformity with a prior act. Instead, the prosecutor asked the trial court for permission to use defendant’s previous conviction to impeach defendant on his specific statement that he is not ‘some big thief.’” Finally, the court rejected his contention that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial once the prosecutor asked about his prior conviction of armed robbery. Given all the “evidence submitted at trial, the prosecutor’s question and defendant’s partial answer were not so egregious that the prejudicial effect could only be removed by granting a mistrial.” Affirmed.